Rationalism vs.
Naturalism and other Orthodoxies
[10/15]
Rationalism and idealism are not two sides of a coin; they are simply one
coin. Of course, the scientific establishment is constantly attempting
to recruit rationality to its own cause. The next time a scientist makes
an appeal to reason, ask her if anyone has ever observed one of them there
reasons.
The
Fallacy of Epistemological Idealism:
Modern philosophy seems to be a
maze of contradictory theories which have arisen in a relatively short period
of time. --------
On the surface, there appears to
be nothing but intellectual chaos. Viewed from a broader standpoint, however,
by far the majority of these theories and systems will be seen to be more or
less alike. They reveal a common parentage and show a common kinship. As such,
then, they possess a uniform trait, a fundamental doctrine identical in them
all, which underlies all the variants and forms the root-idea from which they
derive their origin and then develop into different philosophies. This uniform
trait is idealism, and the root-idea is the idealist postulate.
Here, here! Nothing worse than all these half-baked idealists!
A dime a dozen.
How, then, can the mind perceive
things at a distance, or how can things get into the mind? It does not seem to
solve the difficulty by referring to the stimuli (light waves, airwaves,
etc.), which are supposed to leave the objects and impinge upon the
sense-organs; because then we should perceive these stimuli and not the
objects from which they come. That, however, is not the case: we perceive
apparently objects and certainly not stimuli.
Yes, I always did wonder about that.
The foregoing criticism shows that
idealism arises out of the ego-centric predicament and that its arguments
involve a faulty logic. This, of course, does not prove than extra-mental
reality actually exists; it merely shows that idealism has not disproved the
existence of extra-mental objects. The question of the existence of such
objects must be solved, not by any a priori, but by an a posteriori method.
Facts alone, together with their proper interpretation, must settle the issue;
that is the only scientific and philosophic procedure which can lead us with
safety to a definite conclusion.
Yes, Mam, just the facts, please. Our survival depends upon sticking
to the facts. But to whose facts do we stick? Where is our
authority? Nay, where is our Author?
CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA- Rationalism:
(speaking of authority...)
The term is used: (1) in an exact
sense, to designate a particular moment in the development of Protestant
thought in Germany; (2) in a broader, and more usual, sense to cover the view
(in relation to which many schools may he classed as rationalistic) that the
human reason, or understanding, is the sole source and final test of all
truth. It has further: (3) occasionally been applied to the method of treating
revealed truth theologically, by casting it into a reasoned form, and
employing philosophical Categories in its elaboration.
Not exactly a rousing cheer for rationalism from this authority, and I can
readily sympathize with their cautions...
But in his method of proof of the
authority of Scripture recourse was had to reason, and thus the human mind
became, logically, the ultimate arbiter in the case of both. Supranaturalism
in theology, which it was Wolff's intention to uphold, proved incompatible
with such a philosophical position, and Rationalism took its place. This,
however, is to be distinguished from pure Naturalism, to which it led, but
with which it never became theoretically identified. Revelation was not denied
by the Rationalists; though, as a matter of fact, if not of theory, it was
quietly suppressed by the claim, with its ever-increasing application, that
reason is the competent judge of all truth.
They are not quite denying that our presumably God given, supra-natural
power of reason is not the final arbiter. (Am I sounding too
Protestant?) What else can be? On what other basis can there be an
interfaith dialog, or an apologetics?
I am finding the remainder of this article most helpful, and I urge you to
view the source.
As has been noted in the
preceding paragraph, German Rationalism had strong affinities with English
Deism and French Materialism, two historic forms in which the tendency has
manifested itself. But with the vulgarization of the ideas contained in the
various systems that composed these movements, Rationalism has degenerated.
It has become connected in the popular mind with the shallow and misleading
philosophy frequently put forward in the name of science,....
Amen, to that.
[10/16]
Consider this conceptual
triangle:
Sometimes a distinction is made,
as it has been in different ways by Frege and Popper, between three kinds of
real things (three 'realms' or 'worlds'). The first contains material things....
The second contains psychological things.... The third contains abstract
things.... Philosophers have tended to treat these three realms ... as
lying in a triangle, so that the rejection of one was compatible with
accepting either or both of the other two. Materialists strictly speaking say
that only matter exists, but in modern times they have tended to direct their
fire primarily against believers in the second realm, and some of them (e.g.
Armstrong) accept at least a moderate realism in connection with the third
realm. But this was not always so. Plato, with whom so much of philosophy
began, was primarily concerned to assert the existence of the third realm....
If the rationalists/idealists have established anything it is that realm of
numbers cannot be reduced to material entities. Given the reality of
this 'third realm' then it follows naturally that the realm of the psyche must
also have an immaterial aspect in order to make contact with the realm of
numbers.
The existence of consciousness is very hard to deny, as materialists must,
but its existence cannot be demonstrated objectively, as they insist. The materialists
have the rest of us in a bind, demanding an objectification of non-objects,
i.e. abstracta. 'Abstract' may be a poor word because it implies a
logical dependency, but, in any case, abstraction, per se, is a purely psychic act.
------------------------------
Opposing rationalism is empiricism, which is most narrowly equated with
materialism. More broadly conceived, empiricism becomes naturalism, which
is more loosely defined, so loosely, in fact, to be possibly lacking in
coherence.
Next, we look at naturalism.
Is it a coherent set of beliefs?
What it insists on is that the
world of nature should form a single sphere without incursions from outside by
souls or spirits, divine or human, and without having to accommodate strange
entities like non-natural values or substantive abstract universals.
But it need not reject the phenomena of consciousness, nor even identify them
somehow with material phenomena, as the materialist must, provided they can be
studied via the science of psychology, which can itself be integrated into the
other sciences.
Off the top, psychology is very, very far from being a science. Every
psychologist has a different theory of psychology. In these latter days,
even the physicists are getting into the pluralism act. Every
theoretical physicist has a different conception of what the final Theory of
Everything is going to look like. This simply means that the frontier of
any science will be 'unscientific'. Political, aesthetic, intuitive and
subjective considerations become dominant. This is about charisma at its
highest level. Only when this charisma has been thoroughly routinized
are we back in the realm of science.
From an historical perspective we can think of alchemy as, at one time,
being the frontier of chemistry. Alchemy was a thoroughly charismatic
affair: it reflected intensely personal and creative participation. As
an immaterialist, I would go even further than this. During this
charismatic stage of science, reality is being defined. There is a give
and take between the subjective and objective realms. It is like a
lengthy process of negotiation where the protocols of transaction are being
worked out so at to achieve the greatest harmony as part of the Best Possible
World. Science is not simply a process of discovery. The human
intellect and the cosmic intellect are working out an ultimate accommodation
which is mediated by and through nature.
Psychology is still very much at the charismatic stage as represented by
alchemy. The transactional and transference protocols of psychology are
intensely personal, and the results of which will ultimately define how we
become one with the creator. That is the 'science' of eschatology; that
is what psychology is gradually working up to. The eschatological
psychology will be barely recognizable from what we know today. It may
even become more charismatic than it is now, but that will not prevent it from
also taking on some significant aspects that represent a continuity with the
methods of today's science.
But we were supposed to be discussing naturalism. We have simply
explained why the epistemological form of naturalism is sometimes referred to
as 'psychologism'. It was Frege's reaction to the 'psychologizing' of
mathematics, late in the 19th century, which lead to contemporary
rationalism.
It appears that the academic debate that is of most practical relevance to rational
theism is the debate between rationalists and naturalists. It is
also true that this area of discussion is as active as any in
philosophy.
[10/17]
One of the foci of this discussion is the 'naturalistic
fallacy':
The naturalistic fallacy is a
metaethical theory proposed by G. E. Moore (1873-1958) in Principia Ethica
(1903) that the notion of moral goodness cannot be defined or identified with
any property. Moore argues that "goodness" is a foundational and
unanalyzable property, similar to the foundational notion of
"yellowness," and is not capable of being explained in terms of
anything more basic.
This has a slightly different thrust than the more commonly stated version
of this fallacy as consisting of the attempt to infer 'ought' from 'is', and
going back at least to Hume.
Here is another
take on the fallacy:
Small wonder, then, that faith in
Nature is hard to reconcile with the rationalist philosophers' critique of the
naturalistic fallacy. Environmental ideas of Nature are often based on a
scepticism about the power of reason, and a willingness to put faith in
spontaneous order precisely because one knows the limits of one's own
knowledge about the working of the system.
This points to the divide between naturalistic philosophers, who align
themselves with science, and naturalists simpliciter. Is there
anything in the world more unnatural than science? Natural science
should be an oxymoron. These matters are further complicated by the once
prominent religious notion of Natural Law. And finally, the concept of
human nature is about as contentious as any in the modern world.
James Boyle continues with his
review:
In 'Contested Natures' Phil
Macnaghten and John Urry take up these questions. They argue that we have not
one but many Natures, "constituted through a variety of socio-cultural
processes from which such natures cannot be plausibly separated." Their
argument, if I understand it correctly, is that three things will happen once
we realise that the concept 'Nature' is neither 'natural' nor unitary. First,
we will stop believing that we can get objective science about Nature. The
reason is almost Heisenbergian; the observers are in the frame, not outside of
it. We are part of Nature, part of many Natures, and scientific analysis must
always begin by assuming some pretheoretical orientation towards one of those
'Natures.'
These preceding observations bring us back to the question I posed
yesterday: can anything posing as 'naturalism' be coherent? I am not the
only skeptic on this matter. Naturalism is the de facto, ad hoc
fall-back position for the rag-tag remnants of the once ascendant
materialists. As we speak, they are discovering that this encampment is
not rationally [sic] defensible, and they encounter a lack of sympathy among
the natives.
Now I could be proven wrong in this prognosis, and certainly I am not
specifying a date by which the 'naturalists' will have folded their
tent. I am not holding my breath, but I am, right here before your eyes,
maintaining a vigil. I am supposing that a properly conceived vigil will
expedite the folding of that tent.
And, of course, I am doing rather more than that. I am attempting to
give shape to the tent that will come. As the naturalists get a better
handle on what exactly they are holding out against, it may well increase
their resolve. So be it. What could be the more logical contender
to naturalism than a rational theism, with its attendant BPW
supposition? They may well realize that their best strategy is to fight
every strawperson and ignore every real person. When they are no longer
able to ignore rational theism, the game is over.
-----------------------------
Now I search on rationalism
& naturalism. There are over 5,000 hits.
It is disappointing to see how many people using rationalism in its
particular historical and non-philosophical sense that is now covered by
naturalism. The scientifically inspired attack on religious authority
came way back in what was naively billed as the Age of Reason by self-styled
Rationalists. This confusion means that a lot of people are missing what
is now the principle argument against naturalism. Of course, naturalism
is also a misleading term, chosen perhaps deliberately by those defensive
materialists.
Here is the first substantive
hit. (Note that 'empiricism' is used in place of
'naturalism'):
...the Rationalist holds that some
or all of what is true knowledge is in-nate to us, it is literally inborn with
us; the Empiricist believes the opposite: all of our knowledge arises from our
perceptual experiences in the world after we are born. The name of the school
of Rationalism obviously derives from the word 'rational' which itself goes
back to the Latin, 'ratio' meaning 'calculation'. This in turn goes back to
another Latin word, 'ratus', which is the past participle of 'reor', meaning
"think', 'deem', 'judge'. What runs through all of these is the emphasis
on mind, an emphasis retained in most of the modern associations connected
with the word 'rational' as well: rationalise, rationality, and so on.
'Empiricism' derives from another English word, 'empiric', meaning, 'derived
from experience' (this itself going back to Latin and Greek words for
experience also). So in the plainest language possible, the Rationalist places
the origin of our knowledge of reality in the powers of the mind, whereas the
Empiricist places it in our powers of perception.
As John Mullarkey
points out later in this article, it is also the distinction between deduction
and induction. But in a contemporary cultural sense it is the
distinction between the Analytical and Continental schools of
philosophy. So if I'm so big on rationalism, why don't I just move to
France? Well, the French still see rationalism as opposed to both
religion and nature. They are still back in the Age of 'Enlightenment'.
Hegel's stab at a rational theism was stopped dead in the water by many
converging historical forces. Those deconstructive catholic atheists
show not the slightest inclination to revive it.
[10/18]
By the way, I hit on the following article that is apropos of the interface
of faith and reason: The
Opening of the Evangelical Mind:
If there is a threat to academic
freedom, it comes from what he calls "dogmatic rationalism."
Naturalism, the belief that everything that exists in the world has a
natural origin and can be explained by laws of nature, "becomes
dangerous when, like the dogmatists of old, it declares its way of knowing
to be the only legitimate one and then seeks to disenfranchise other
voices."
Notice that even the editors of the Atlantic Monthly are disposed to equate
rationalism with naturalism. The whole religion-science debate may hinge
upon the distinction.
Continuing on with the rationalism
& naturalism listing, I find the most complete statement of the
anti-naturalist view of the mind: Mind
and the World of Nature by Steven
Horst. He is still drafting some of the chapters. I have not
run across any defense of naturalism that is nearly as comprehensive.
The 'neuro-philosophy' tomes we looked a earlier simply do not address many of
these basic philosophical issues. The papers that do address these
issues do so in a piecemeal fashion.
Now here is a revealing article by a secular humanist: Evolutionary
Naturalism: the Philosophical Foundations of Humanism. Pat Hutcheon
reads the Darwinian riot act to his fellow humanists:
Do you assume that human beings
cannot know anything beyond nature, nor can they know anything by any means
beyond the use of the senses and the application of reason to experience? Do
you consider that any sound understanding of reality must begin with a
bottom-up, empirical search for cause and effect relationships -- rather than
with a priori axioms and a top-down process of deductive rationalism?....
Do you assume that language is
merely a tool evolved within our species of primate and that the terms we
apply to categories of experience do not carry within them any
"essence" of the reality they serve to symbolize? Are you skeptical
of holistic approaches to knowing, or to healing, with their grand designs for
social change -- or total harmony of being -- that can be neither analyzed nor
tested? Do you refuse to devote time and effort to a search for the underlying
meaning and purpose of life, and for your own role in some universal cosmic
plan?....
All of which was prompted by the following observation:
Many European humanists -- because
of deeply embedded cultural tendencies toward romanticism and Kantian
transcendentalism [and Rationalism?] -- have never really adopted the
evolutionary world view implied by modern science. For them postmodernism is
an all-too-easy out. It allows them to have their cake and eat it too. They
can avoid facing up to the implications of evolution for human behavior. They
can say that, yes, science is one way of comprehending reality; but there are
other, equally legitimate modes of knowing. "Most of us here are not in
the least interested in Darwinian evolutionary ideology", I have been
told a number of times by humanists in Europe. Indeed, I am beginning to
suspect that the "postmodern" point of view, which sees all
approaches to knowing -- including the scientific one -- as equally
ideological in nature, is rapidly becoming the prevailing philosophy among
humanists in many parts of the world.
Yes, those Continentals are a subversive bunch. And Pat is right
about having to draw a line in the sand. One, well aimed, immaterial
stone could bring down the whole glass house that is materialism. The
Continental mysticism is a pragmatic defense against the immanent, logical
collapse of scientific materialism. They don't want to be taken down
with that edifice. They don't want to have to ride shotgun for Science
as do their Analytical colleagues over here. The Continentals hope that
only one end of the secular boat will sink.
This rather obvious point about Freud vs. rationalism had not occurred to
me:
One of the strongest blows to
classical rationalism did not come from the crisis of its bulwarks at the
turn of the century (applied non-Euclidean geometry, logical
conventionalism, etc.), but rather from Freud's attack on the crystalline
transparency of self-consciousness. In effect, Chomsky's neo-rationalism in
linguistics adopted from the start the ‘opaque’ character of language
universals.
No wonder that neo-rationalism is an uphill battle. This is from a
footnote of Alberto Peruzzi in 'From
Kant to Entwined Naturalism'. I'm attempting to discern a possible
Continental flavor to naturalism, hopefully it will be spiced up a bit.
I am reminded of Linsky & Zalta's Naturalized Platonism vs. Platonized Naturalism
discussed on the previous
page. In the present case, Peruzzi is using the mathematical theory of
categories to Kantianize Nature. Again, this is not grandmother's idea
of Nature, but scientists have been mathematizing Nature from the
beginning. Also Peruzzi reminds us that logic and math are normative
sciences rather than descriptive. Is this how we can smuggle
intentionality into Nature? Are the Continentals going to help the
naturalists get off the materialist hook by making irreducibility more
scientifically palatable? Let us see. I suspect, however, that
this is another foot in the door for rationalism, and that by giving it these
few inches, it will not be difficult for rationalism to take the whole nine
yards. But am I the only one who respects the potency of the
rational? Has Freud reduced the ratio to the libido? Obviously the
cosmic libido respected the rationale of the Monster Group or we would not
have Physics. Creation is about the entwining of the Life force and the
Logos to produce the BPW. A real neat trick!
But then why am I calling this 'rational theism' and not 'libidinous
theism'. I may have just been taking the libidinous part as a given, as
in, 'give us a break!' On the Trinitarian scheme does the Force reside
more with the Son or the Spirit? It will be on your next
quiz.
Science, in its transactions with Nature, recognizes neither
the vital force nor the logos. The logos of mathematical physics is a
significant exception.
[10/19]
While reading Peruzzi, I notice the next essay
on the Google list, rationalism
& naturalism, is 'THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN CHRISTIAN THEISM, METAPHYSICAL
NATURALISM AND RELATIVISM: HOW TO PROCEED IN SCIENCE?' by Jitse van der Meer
(1995). It has been posted on the ASA
website. The American Scientific Affiliation espouses a more
academically respectable version of creationism with God working through
nature, more or less, but it is more demanding of scientific openness than
anything you would find at the AAAS, for instance, although I am sure that
many scientists who are also evangelical belong to both out of professional
necessity. Van der Meer is emphasizing the intellectual tension that
must exist between naturalism and theism. This is a tension that I have
found to be notably lacking among the more nominally, or non-evangelical
theistic scientists, who see science as another job. They just work
there, so to speak. It is not part of their job description to wax
metaphysical, and they'll be damned if anyone tries to make an issue of it, as
Jitse does here.
[Incidentally, the Intelligent Design/Irreducible Complexity
advocates do not appear to have a presence in the ASA. I'm not sure how
closely affiliated the IDers are with the reactionary creationists.]
I then suggest that science
needs to expand its methodology beyond the current confines. This expansion
consists of accepting non-material causes in scientific explanations, and
using broader criteria for theory choice. Instead of explanations that use
material causes only, science needs multi-dimensional explanations that
admit the causal efficacy of purpose and intent. Not only is the pursuit of
several different explanations more adequate for a multi-dimensional
reality, but it also provides a way of limiting one-dimensional explanations
including those developed in terms of matter alone. This is an hermeneutical
approach to explanation in the natural sciences which emphasizes
"understanding" and sees explanation in material terms as one form
of it.
This is not an unreasonable suggestion, but it will not be taken up without
a 'struggle', our without a major shift in public sentiment and understanding.
It will not be taken up until rational theism is more widely appreciated.
Methodological materialism is
important because it acknowledges the materiality of creation.
Well, there just went the whole ballgame. There's a throwaway line
for you. Can anyone out there tell me why the prophetic traditionalists
are knee-jerk dualists? I keep trying to understand this dogmatic
dichotomy of Creator and Creation, but cannot quite fathom it. Are not
human souls part of creation? Are they not immaterial? Ergo,
Jitse is in a blatant self-contradiction. His obliviousness to this
blinding inconsistency is endemic among theologians. Will someone please
clue me in? What is going on here?
[10/22]
I've spent the last couple of days perusing reductionism
& mathematics. I am finding no defenders of reductionism.
Dawkins remains the primary advocate of materialism; however, his 'memes' are
decidedly immaterial entities, rendering him anomalous. After him comes
Dennett, but his 'functions' are neither physical nor reducible.
There are quite a few philosophers who are 'non-reductive
materialists', but I am not the only one who sees their position as
self-contradictory. And these latter-day materialists seem motivated
primarily by the desire to avoid Cartesian dualism. Their monistic
predilection may put them in the forefront of idealism when its turn comes
again. Their colleagues have too readily surrendered to the
blandishments of pluralism.
Materialists lately refer to themselves as 'physicalists'. However,
if you ask a physicist what physics reduces to, they will likely respond with
'mathematics'. If you ask a mathematician what mathematics reduces to,
my perusal of the above list tells me that you will not get a definite
answer. A century ago, the answer might have been 'logic', but that
aspiration has long vanished. Are there any irreducible mathematical
objects to which one may point? There are many objects that seem
quasi-reducible at best. My favorite remains the Monster
Group, which
many believe has physical ramifications, along with its more diminutive siblings.
It does contain many of the smaller sporadic groups as subgroups, but as
the largest of that class, it is technically irreducible to them. It is
not just the sum of its parts, because its group structure specifies a unique
set of relations amongst all its elements. One might claim that the
Monster is reducible to the coding of its existence theorem. However,
the fact that this putative theorem has never been assembled in one place, is
not fully understood by any one person, and is estimated that it would fill
some 1,500 pages [3/10/03: wrong,
it was 15,000 pages compiled by some 50 mathematicians between 1961 and 1980
(additional reference)], renders this form of reduction less than compelling.
Surely, the existence proof of the Monster is already contained cryptically
somewhere in the decimal expansion of Pi, along with Shakespeare's sonnets,
but specifying its location therein might require many more than 1,500
[15,000] pages. But the Monster group is not physical, per se. It can
exist only as an idea, and not as an isolated idea, but only as part of a
seemingly unspecifiable, holistic set of ideas embedded in an intelligence
having considerable overlap with human intelligence. Reductionism seems
only able to lead us into irreducible logical circles. Its would-be
defenders have been left in disarray.
Where does that leave the rest of us? That leaves us as if suspended
on the edge of reality. Suddenly our world is populated by many new and
mysterious objects. What are we to make of this new landscape?
Whatever else might be said of this landscape, intelligence is not an
epiphenomenal aspect of it. Can concepts exist without conceivers, or
experiences without experiencers? By definition, intelligence is structured
to render the world minimally intelligible. Given the existence of
immaterial, irreducible intelligences, it would seem unnatural to confine
higher intelligence to a purely dependent existence. Especially so if we
come to suspect, as many have, that the peculiar abstractions of space and
time are dependent constructs of mind. In that case, our own immersion
in space and time is an integral aspect of a cosmic construct to whose
intelligibility we are prime witnesses.
[10/23]
It is revealing to read Steve Weinberg's comments, REDUCTIONISM
REDUX, on the reductionism symposium at Jesus College in 1992. His
arrogance is equaled only by the shallowness of his discussion. I have
not read the proceedings, but there does appear to have been a dearth of
philosophical reflection in a discussion dominated by scientists throwing
barbs at each other, a technique easily mastered by Steve. Steve's now
'Standard Theory' combining weak, electric and strong forces may well have
been the last hurrah of reductionism, or as he calls it 'grand
reductionism'. Steve's 'grand' project was already being 'sneered' at
even before the ink on his awards had dried. What role is left for him
but curmudgeonhood?
There is another reason for some
of the opposition to reductionism, and specifically to the perspective
provided by grand reductionism. It is that this perspective removes much of
the traditional motivation for belief in God.
Now there's a bit of candor. One almost has to wonder if Steve is
concerned about his historical spot in the cosmic pecking order. By the
same token, any significant shortfall in the grand project is evidence for
cosmic purpose. Check out his defense
of the 'meaningless universe'. With both Dawkins' and Dennett's
reductionism suspect, Weinberg might have to be given the top spot on
reductionism's hit parade. His motivation seems to lack personal
conviction; what I see instead is a literal reductio ad absurdum
of his professional role playing.
Steve's equation of modernism with 'grand reductionism' is correct, and so
is its adversity to theism. The postmodern refusal to grapple with
either rationalism or theism is its defining characteristic. It is a
deliberate lacuna that is consigning its practitioners to instant
irrelevance. The cottage industry of theological apologetics for science
should be a scandal. Steve and the fundamentalists have the correct
assessment. Pluralism is a desperate ploy to curtail thought and
discussion of anything foundational. Anti-foundationalism has nowhere to
stand.
Meanwhile the evidence against reductionism is mounting. It is
strongest in the areas of epistemology and linguistics, areas that traditional
reductive science abjures. The subtle arguments of its practitioners are
lost beneath the furious controversy concerning human nature. Piaget's
and Chomsky's structuralism was much too easily subsumed under biological
genetics. Their 'genetic epistemology' was never intended to be about
DNA, and the public ignorance of their subdued protestations to that effect
only underscores the pervasiveness of the modern reductive
hegemony.
The starkly theistic implications of any anti-reductionism, as touted by
Steve, pose a great intellectual and political barrier to its academic
proponents. They must toil amidst the unobtrusive details, leaving the
obvious speculations to us outsiders. Even the growing cadre of
theistically committed philosophers is slotted into areas of ethics. It
is true, however, that there is a major overlap between ethics and
epistemology. It is in that obscure venue that we might keep an eye out
for an anti-reductive theistic initiative. Epistemology represents the
soft underbelly of scientific materialism.
Plantinga's Reformed
Epistemology is certainly a move in a parallel direction, but it does not
focus specifically on reductionism. Alvin is just looking to construct a
new branch of epistemology, a safe harbor for theism, rather than provoke a
general confrontation. The neo-theists are following his lead, to the
relief of their secularist colleagues. That the reformed and
evolutionary accounts of epistemology can much longer avoid a confrontation is
doubtful, however.
-------------------------
Let us look at "reformed
epistemology" & reductionism. An interesting article, 'The
Relationship between Philosophy and Theology in the Postmodern Age'
(1999), is on the al-Islam website. This is
an important essay. It provides a comprehensive
introduction to contemporary philosophy of religion; actually, it is the best I
have seen on the Internet to-date.
While philosophy in the U.S. has
been dominated by analytic thought throughout, most of the twentieth century,
over the last ten or fifteen years, continental thought has come to play a
prominent role in American philosophy. What is emerging is a "world
philosophy," but one from which the Islamic world is largely excluded.
The reason for this exclusion is not because of some conspiracy to suppress
Islamic thought, but because we Muslims have not seriously attempted to enter
the discussion. If we are to enter the discussion, we must beware that it
takes place in what is often hostile territory, in the context of
expectations, presuppositions and standards of reasoning many of which are
quite foreign to those found in the Islamic sciences.
What a breath of fresh air from Dr. Muhammad Legenhausen.
Consider, for example, the role of
the principle that an actual infinity of causes is impossible. A number of
Western philosophers, physicists and mathematicians have come to doubt this
principle. In defense of the principle, an important book has been written in
which some of the ideas of Muslim philosophers are given attention: William
Lane Craig's The Kalam Cosmological Argument (New York: Harper & Row,
1979). This is one of the rare cases in which ideas from the Islamic tradition
(particularly those of Abu Humid Ghazali) have been the subject of discussion
in the contemporary philosophy of religion.
I'll bet you didn't know that.
Other defenders of the Christian
faith have argued that the doubts raised by Hume (1711-1776) and Kant
(1724-1804) about the rationality of religious belief can be answered through
an examination of the standards of reasoning employed in the natural sciences
today, which are far from what Hume and Kant imagined.
Amen, Brother. Is it peculiar or not that the best
summary of Christian philosophy comes from Islam?
The theologian provides the
philosopher with the doctrinal setting in terms of which reports of mystical
experiences are understood, and the philosopher provides a critical analysis
of both doctrine and report in order to place mystical experiences within the
framework of a broader epistemological theory.
Dr. Muhammad is getting me in trouble. I may be violating Federal Law
with more than 'fair use' of his article.
[10/24]
Here is another helpful summary: 'An
Evangelical Theological Response to Postmodernity'. (This essay, as
noted, was cached by Google from an inactive site. Unfortunately, no other information is
available.) I agree with the notion of a global ethic:
Many of the issues which have
fostered the development of postmodern thinking are primarily ethical,
causing Grenz to comment on the growing concern for a community-based ethic
of being.164
In the postmodern world we are
becoming increasingly aware that every ethical proposal - even ethics
itself - is embedded in an interpretive framework which in the end
comprises the shared belief structure - the theology - of a community. In
short, every understanding of the ethical life is ultimately derived from
a community-based vision, which links the personal life with something
beyond.165
Grenz believes that the hope for
a global ethic, which originally arose out of the modern pluralist ethos, is
even more workable in a postmodern communitarian climate.166
I am most sympathetic with the teleology:
Through the cultivation of a
proleptic [i.e. anticipatory] consciousness of the yet-to-be consummated whole
of reality, we can gain an awareness and anticipation ahead of time of the
future whole, 111 based on Gods promise and faith in Gods faithfulness. The
gospel of Jesus Christ promises a destiny - the new creation, which means
reality is future-oriented. Only with the fulfillment of this promise does
reality become a whole and the true nature of all the parts, including
ourselves, is revealed. In the life death and resurrection of Jesus, we see
ahead of time what this nature is.
He examines the notion of Gods
creating as a continuous act, drawing implications for modern
cosmological ideas, and introducing the concept of proleptic creation. God
creating from the future, not the past, means that it is the continuing divine
work of future-giving that is the source of life and being. For Peters, Gods
creative activity within nature and history derives from Gods redemptive work
of drawing free and contingent beings into a harmonious whole. 114
[10/25]
In this last, anonymous essay, mention is made of Wolfhart Pannenberg (1928
-). This is a name that I have not run into in years. My bad.
He is an advocate of 'systematic theology'. I am wondering if he may
exhibit coherentist and idealist tendencies. Stanley J. Grenz, an
American follower, provides a review:
In contrast to the classical
tradition, he declares that truth is not found in the unchanging essences
lying behind the flow of time, but is essentially historical and ultimately
eschatological. Until the eschaton, truth will remain provisional and truth
claims contestable. Therefore, theology. like all human knowledge, is
provisional. It simply cannot pack into formulas the truth of God. The
future alone is the focal point of ultimate truth. As a result. all dogmatic
statements are hypotheses to be tested for coherence with other knowledge.
This, he claims, is in accordance with the Scriptures, which declare that
only at the end of history is the deity of God unquestionably open to all-an
event. however, that is anticipated in the present.
OK for coherentism, and we get the eschaton as a bonus. I am
embarrassed not to have remembered Wolfhart much sooner. This indicates
a lacuna in my Internet search strategy. .
[10/26]
While missing Pannenberg, I also have missed the lasting Hegelian and
German idealist influence on modern theology. In previously picking up
on Anglo-American theistic idealism, I was mainly seeing an offshoot of the
former. However, after WWII, French existentialism and scepticism became
dominant on the Continent, and theistic idealism toiled in relative
obscurity.
Pannenberg's influence may be expanding in the US, of late, despite a
pervasive anti-idealist undercurrent which remains characteristically inchoate.
It seems to be an opposition mainly directed against subjective
idealism.
I need to focus on this trend, and particularly in its eschatological
form. For all I know right now, Pannenberg is the only exponent of this
form. My speculation is that Wolfhart is an amillennialist: all the
drama is focused on the eschaton. In contrast, I am a pre-millennialist:
there is a dramatic overturn of materialism that ushers in the
Millennium. If this is true of Wolfhart, I don't know his rationale,
but, again, let me speculate. For Wolfhart, the eschaton lies in the
distant and otherwise unforeseeable future, thus the concept of an historical
Millennium would be a relatively minor addendum at best.
Carl Henry is perhaps the premier orthodox Christian theologian. Here
is a review: Carl
Henry's Reasoned Apologetic:
Henry launches his metaphysical
inquiry in these works by asserting the supernatural reality and objectivity
of God against a tradition of dialectical and existentialist [and idealist]
theology whose roots are traced to Kant and Kierkegaard, current
manifestations he believes are the subjectivizing tendencies of Barth,
Brunner, and Aulèn, as well as Tillich and Bultmann. Thus the author returns
to the emphasis in earlier volumes on Scripture's univocal propositional
knowledge as juxtaposed to the non-cognitive [sic] personal encounters
attributed to neo-orthodox theology, or to the ambiguities of the analogical
language as defended in the tradition that runs from Aquinas to Mascall. The
future-oriented theologies of Moltmann and Pannenberg also come under
criticism for casting doubt on the present reality of deity and the lack of
adherence to scriptural testimony about the incarnation.
---------
These doctrinal errors are all
finally traced to a reliance on philosophical conceptuality rather than
biblical revelation.
The last sentence sums up the perennial objection to reason. One
might wonder if human rationality were the work of Satan. Carl is our
articulate, literate bibliolater. He can't see Jesus for all the
Christianity. Rationalism and coherentism struggle to obtain a foothold
in the no man's land between science and religion.
I would argue that Henry's incoherent, legalistic literalism is the same
one that informs scientism as well as analytic philosophy. [and see
below]
[10/27]
How 'bout that eschaton! Let's listen to Bob Russell, Founder and
Director, The Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, Berkeley,
1981-present, speaking from his important meta-library:
According to Wolfhart Pannenberg,
all Christian theology depends on the future coming of God. Eschatology
thus involves “one of the most obvious conflicts between a worldview based
on modern science and the Christian faith.” John Macquarrie, too,
wrote that “...if it were shown that the universe is indeed headed for an
all-enveloping death, then this might seem to constitute a state of affairs so
negative that it might be held to falsify Christian faith and abolish
Christian hope.” Are these conclusions avoidable?
Good question, Bob.
The only alternative is truly
radical: to pursue the possibility that a commitment to eschatology will lead
to an alternative scientific [sic] cosmology.
Tipler and Pannenberg have engaged
in an interesting and constructive interaction to which Drees, myself and
others have replied. Meanwhile, Tipler’s scientific claims have been
attacked aggressively by other scientists while both Dyson’s and Tipler’s
theological proposals and their reductionist assumptions have been widely
criticized by scholars including Polkinghorne, Barbour, Peacocke, Clayton and
Worthing.
If this alternative is not to be
taken, what options are left? [Immaterialism, anyone?]
Polkinghorne is representative of most theological views when reminding us
that “an ultimate hope will have to rest in an ultimate reality, that is to
say, in the eternal God himself, and not in his creation.” Such hope
is not in the survival of death of a purported soul, since we are a
psychosomatic unity. Instead it is in our resurrection: God remembering us and
recreating us in a radically new environment. God will create the world to
come through a transformation of the universe.
Maybe, Bob, just maybe, we get to participate in this recreational
transformation of our already immaterial universe. A radical recreation
implies a radically sub-optimal creation. It wasn't a Big Bang, it was a
Big Boner! I don't think so, Bob.
Worthing has proposed that we take up
Pannenberg’s distinction between theological and scientific apocalyptic
visions. Rather than equate the parousia with the remote future end of the
universe, Worthing suggests we understand it as a renewal or transformation of
the universe as a whole. The Biblical ‘end’ is not a cosmic end, since it
“allows for a bodily resurrection and creation of a new heaven and new
earth. ”This, in turn, shifts the discussion from the end of the world
to the concept of eternity as the real issue in relating science and theology.
We are led to consider “the future of the universe...(as) taken up into the
eternality of the Creator --- an eternality of a decisively different order
from that which the physical universe could potentially possess...”.
Exactly what does this mean, Bob? Why do you insist on this
incoherent dualism?
Ted Peters writes from just such a perspective,
developing the Trinitarian theology of the 20th century with particular
attention to the implications of Big Bang and quantum cosmology. What we need
is “temporal holism” in which the cosmos as a unity of time and space is
both created proleptically from the future and redeemed eschatologically by
God’s future initiative which we know proleptically in Jesus Christ.
Prolepsis ties together futurum, the ordinary sense of future resulting from
present causes, and adventus, the appearance of something absolutely new,
namely the kingdom of God, the renewal of creation. The creation, from
alpha to omega, will be consummated and transformed into the eschatological
future which lies beyond, but which will include, this creation as a whole.
“The eschatological future is the key that opens the gate to eternity.”
Peters, too, is ruthlessly honest about the challenge from science. “Should
the final future as forecasted by (scientific cosmology) come to pass...then
we would have proof that our faith has been in vain. It would turn out to be
that there is no God, at least not the God in whom follows of Jesus have put
their faith.”
Amen!
I believe the approaches suggested by
Pannenberg, Polkinghorne, and Peters are particularly promising, but I also
want to underscore the challenge of making them intelligible in detail in
light of scientific cosmology as it currently stands. If we are to engage in a
genuinely mutual interaction, a more complex methodology is called for. I will
make preliminary suggestions about such a methodology in Part III: F.
Don't hold your breath, folks: Part III: F, seems no longer to exist.
Should we be grateful to be spared the 'more complex methodology'? Only
by God's grace do some of us refrain from 'methodology'! I did meet Bob
once: a theological apparatchik. But what else could he be if he
chooses not to rise to the messianic occasion? All the more for the rest
of us. Thanks, Bob.
There you have the bleeding edge of academic eschatology.
----------------------------------
Now we need to check out that German idealistic theism, tracing its genealogy
to the present.
Starting with idealistic theism,
the first entry is On the Rationality of Theism,
right up our alley. It starts out as a critique of Ayn Rand. Scott
Ryan surmises that her incoherence stems from her emotion laden atheism.
He then matriculates to his own cosmology.
I hope it is clear that classical theism is
"idealistic" in this sense, i.e., it maintains that reality
consists fundamentally of a single absolute mind and, less fundamentally, of
the objects created by that mind's activity.
This is not rocket science. How then are so many theologians still
hung up on Cartesian dualism, three centuries after the fact? What a
waste of mind.
Unfortunately, Scott does not manage to put Ms. Rand behind him for
long. I have yet to comprehend either the positive or negative
fascination with this person. Shades of Blavatsky?
Charlatan?
But hear his concise defense of idealism:
Now, beyond the claim (made earlier) that
there simply are no fully "external" relations, I can suggest at
least two further powerful reasons for thinking that the relation between
thought and object is not external in the other direction either. One is
that the object of thought must be such as to be "thinkable."
Thus, if (as we have suggested) everything which exists can, in principle,
be present to and instantiated in thought, then to say that something is
"real" is to make essential (though not necessarily explicit)
reference to thought.
The other is that even on the most strongly
"materialist" or "physicalist" view (I emphasize with
Grayling that these are not the same), it still seems to be the case that
the "material" or "physical" universe gives rise, in a
causal manner, to the existence of mind. If the cause-and-effect relation is
also a logical relation, so that causes logically entail their effects and
(arguably) vice versa, then the material or physical universe does logically
entail the existence of thoughts "about" it.
So it appears that we cannot strictly
conceive of any "external" reality that is so completely
independent of thought as to be related to it externally even in one
direction. Thought is not "external" to its object if (a) that
object is such as to be "thinkable" and therefore composed of the
sort of stuff that can be instantiated in our thoughts, or if (b) the
cause-and-effect relation between "matter" and "mind"
involves logical entailment, so that "mind" was a causal
potentiality always logically, and thus eternally, present within
"matter." Either of these points suffices to establish that
"external" reality is not logically independent of mind in any
meaningful sense.
I appreciate Scott's fresh restatement of classical
arguments.
[10/28]
From theistic idealism,
I find an excellent source
(Britannica? What else?) on its modern provenance.
And here is a lengthy, vitriolic rebuttal
to Scott Ryan by Greg S. Nyquist. Greg does capture much of the current popular
sentiment against idealism. I'm not aware that Scott has
responded. Greg frequently alludes to the 'absurdity' of idealism.
I gather that he is generally and implicitly referring to what Ralph Barton
Perry called the 'ego-centric predicament', but I don't think this alleged
'predicament' has had a lasting impact. Rand had her own kind of
ego-centric predicament. What is shared in Johnson's, Nietzsche's,
Rand's and popular critiques is a rather crude, unthinking, anti-idealist machismo.
This visceral reaction likely shares
something with the orthodox reaction represented by Carl
Henry. One illuminates the other. Henry is in partial denial
of his own idealist
influences:
The most influential figures on Henry’s
thought are Gordon Haddon Clark and Edgar Sheffield Brightman. Ronald Nash
summarized Clark’s thought as following: (1) the epistemological
bankruptcy of any form of philosophical or religious empiricism; (2) the
indispensability of Divine revelation to human knowledge as a whole; (3) the
shortcomings of any attempt to remove the cognitive and propositional
element from the content of God’s revelation; (4) the importance of
refusing to separate faith from reason whether this separation be a
humanistic attack on faith, an existentialist critique of reason, or a
Thomistic segregation of the two into different realms of human knowledge;....
Also Edgar S. Brightman who was Henry’s
professor in the studying period at Boston University is one of significant
figures of Boston Personalist tradition. Brightman’s personal and theistic
idealism influenced to Henry. He argues that whatever exists must be an
element in the experience of a conscious mind. Hence, everything will exist
as an element either in some finite mine or in God’s mind. Also for him,
personality is the highest kind of conscious life.
We need to follow-up on Carl's conflicted thought.
Something to note about the orthodox is their taboo on
God. God may reach out and touch us, but we are not meant to return the
favor, on pain of being struck by a divine thunderbolt. This is
true. Once we act upon the divine mutuality implied by rationalism and
idealism, we are setting in motion the eschaton and whatever apocalypses may
attend upon it. The popular anti-idealist machismo thinly
disguises a deep, collective fear of our Maker. Only such a reversal
could explain its visceral vehemence. This same fear motivates the
attraction of materialism and Cartesianism. Don't touch God!!
All such tribal taboos are meant to reinforce perceived cosmic
dichotomies. Any violation is dire.
---------------------
One might, however, be instructed by Mr. Nyquist's interest in Santayana, 'last
century's greatest philosopher.'
Santayana may be the original naturalist. From the Britannica:
Scepticism and Animal Faith (1923)
conveys better than any other volume the essential import of his philosophy.
It formulates his theory of immediately apprehended essences and describes
the role played by "animal faith" in various forms of knowledge.
"The realm of essence," in
Santayana's system, is that of the mind's certain and indubitable knowledge.
Essences are universals that have being or reality but do not exist. They
include colours, tastes, and odours as well as the ideal objects of thought
and imagination. "The realm of matter" is the world of natural
objects; belief in it rests--as does all belief concerning existence--on
animal faith. Naturalism, the dominant theme of his entire philosophy,
appears in his insistence that matter is prior to the other realms.
This quibble about essences is at the bottom of the incoherence of all
attempts at a non-reductive materialism: mind is epiphenomenal relative to
matter, and essences are epiphenomenal relative to mind, so they don't exist,
but they're real. The notion of real non-existence smacks of purest
sophistry. If one could penetrate the rationale for this sophistry, one
might be further instructed. I'm of the impression, though, that Santayana
has little residual clout among professional philosophers.
Then there was Bertrand: Russell's The Problems of Philosophy:
Russell was a realist on two key issues,
universals and material objects. In both cases he was opposed to much of
nineteenth century idealism.
Bertrand was a 'neutral monist'. That would be a more accurate appellation
for 'naturalism'.
Once again we are back to the question of reductionism. I am not
aware that there has been a global or thorough-going reductionist. Who
will be the last materialist? I cannot name a contemporary philosophical
materialist. Such a person would have a technically argued global thesis
of physical reductionism. I don't know that there has been an extreme
and reasoned materialism presented in modern history. Holbach's Systeme
de la Nature (1770) may have been the first and last such
thesis.
We then have to explain the existence of knowable irreducible entities,
even if there were only one. Partial reductionisms abound: there is no
consensus as to the primary candidates for irreducibility, yet no one is
claiming there are no such entities.
At the very least, there must be material atoms, along with some form of
informational or perceptual atoms, whether the latter might comprise numbers,
logical atoms or sense data of some kind. A perceptual atom might exist
only in individual experience. Even if consciousness were an illusion,
there would still be the fact of information transfer, and so there would have
to be informational atoms or bits. The bits may be physically
instantiated, but they must also be abstractable by the communicating
agents. Bit patterns have a computational or functional significance
that supervenes on the physical pattern. By definition, there can be
miscommunication, but miscommunication has no purely physical analog.
There are no mistakes in physics. Physics always just keeps on
happening, regardless of anyone's protocol. Informational 'noise' is not
a physical construct. I am not aware that anyone has ever claimed that
information does not exist. Even if one eliminated mind and
consciousness, materialism would be strictly incoherent if there existed no
information about matter.
Informational bits, although physically instantiated are not physically
reducible. Indeed, instantiation is not a physical construct. It
is nowhere represented in the extensive terminology of physical science.
With the advent of quantum physics, many physicists are espousing various
forms of metaphysical 'informationalism', and there are, of course,
informational/physical dualists, but none who deny information, per se, to my
knowledge.
Where do genetic DNA sequences fit into this picture? Are they
physical or informational? I would have to say they are an indeterminate
hybrid, or proto-informational. I'm sorry not to be more
informative. Be informed, however, that the idealist's notion of
genetics strays very far from that of the materialist. Be grateful that
I have been sparing you all the 'scare quotes' on 'atoms', 'DNA', etc.
Your computer may run on bits, but mine runs on 'bits'. If 'you' do not believe 'me', just wait until 'we' are all 'using' 'quantum'
"bits"!
Could not one be a strict nominalist about information? Names carry
information. There is no way to duck that bullet. But if anyone
does know how to duck it, please communicate that information to us.
If these last few paragraphs do not constitute the reductio
of reductionism, nothing will. We cannot shed any more tears over its
demise. Our next stop is the Eschaton. There is no other end for
non-reductionism. If I can't prove that, the messiah will.
<-- Prev
Next -->
Topical Index